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Abstract—The public key cryptosystem based on
rank error correcting codes (the GPT cryptosystem)
was proposed in 1991. Use of rank codes in crypto-
graphic applications is advantageous since it is prac-
tically impossible to utilize combinatoric decoding.
This enabled using public keys of a smaller size.
Several attacks against this system were published,
including Gibson’s attacks and more recently Over-
beck’s attacks. A few modifications were proposed
withstanding Gibson’s attack but at least one of them
was broken by the stronger attacks by Overbeck.
A tool to prevent Overbeck’s attack is presented in
[12]. In this paper, we apply this approach to other
variants of the GPT cryptosystem.
I. INTRODUCTION
The first code-based public-key cryptosystem is
introduced and investigated in [1]. The system is
based on Goppa codes in the Hamming metric. It
is a strong cryptosystem but the size of a public
key is too large for practical implementations to
be efficient.
The public key cryptosystem based on rank error
correcting codes was proposed in [2], [3] and is
now called the GPT cryptosystem.
Rank codes are well structured. It makes eas-
ier creation of attacks. Subsequently in a series
of works, Gibson [4], [5] developed attacks that
break the GPT system for public keys of about
5 Kbits which are efficient for practical values of
parameters n ≤ 30, where n is length of rank codes
with the field F2n as an alphabet.
Several variants of the GPT PKC were intro-
duced to withstand Gibson’s attacks [6], [7]. One
proposal is use of a rectangular row scramble ma-
trix instead of a square matrix. This allows to work
with subcodes of rank codes having much more
complicated structure. Another proposal exploits a
modification of Maximum Rank Distance (MRD)
codes where the concept of a column scramble ma-
trix was also introduced. A new class of rank codes,
so called, reducible codes, are also implemented to
modify the GPT cryptosystem [8], [9]. All these
variants withstand Gibson’s attack.
Recently, R. Overbeck [10], [11] proposed a
new attack which is more effective than any of
Gibson’s attacks. His method is based on the fact
that a column scrambler is defined over the base
field. A generalization and development of one
Gibson’s idea allows him to break many instances
of the GPT cryptosystem. It was found in [12]
that a cryptographer can define a proper column
scrambler over the extension field without violation
of the standard mode of the PKC. It turns out that
Overbeck’s attack fails in this case.
In this paper, we implement an idea of a proper
choice of column scramblers over the extension
field to other variants of the GPT cryptosystem.
This choice withstands Overbeck’s attacks as well
as Gibson’s attacks.
II. THE GPT CRYPTOSYSTEM
A. Rank codes
Let Fq be a finite field of q elements and let FqN
be an extension field of degree N .
Let x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) be a vector with
coordinates in FqN .
The Rank norm of x is denoted Rk(x | Fq) and
is defined as the maximal number of xi, which are
linearly independent over the base field Fq.
Similarly, for a matrix M with entries in FqN
the column rank is defined as the maximal number
of columns, which are linearly independent over
the base field Fq, and is denoted Rk(M | Fq).
The Rank distance between x and y is defined
as the rank norm of the difference x − y, i.e.
d(x,y) = Rk(x− y | Fq).
The theory of optimal MRD (Maximal Rank
Distance) codes is given in [13]. A generator
matrix Gk of a MRD code is defined by
Gk =


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where g1, g2, . . . , gn are any set of elements of the
extension field Fqn which are linearly independent
over the base field Fq.
The notation g[i] := gqi mod n means the ith
Frobenius power of g.
A code with the generator matrix (1) is referred
to as a (n, k, d) code, where n is the code length,
k is the number of information symbols, d is the
code distance. For MRD codes, d = n− k + 1.
Let m = (m1,m2, . . . ,mk) be an information
vector of dimension k. The corresponding code
vector is the n-vector
g(m) = mGk.
If y = g(m) + e and Rk(e) = s ≤ t = d−12 ,
then the information vector m can be recovered
uniquely from y by some decoding algorithm.
There exist fast decoding algorithms for MRD
codes [13], [14]. A decoding procedure requires
elements of the (n−k)×n parity check matrix H
such that GkH⊤ = 0. For decoding, the matrix H
should be of the form
H =

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where elements h1, h2, . . . , hn are in the extension
field Fqn and are linearly independent over the base
field Fq.
B. Description of the standard GPT cryptosystem
The GPT cryptosystem is described as follows.
1) Possible generator matrices using as public
keys: Denote by Gpub the public key, which is a
generator matrix of a code.
1)
Gpub = SGkP. (3)
The main matrix Gk is given by Eq. (1). It
is used to correct rank errors. Errors of rank
not greater than t =
⌊
n−k
2
⌋
can be corrected.
A square k × k matrix S over the extension
field Fqn is called the row scrambling matrix.
It is used to destroy any visible structure of
the matrix Gk by mixing its rows.
A matrix P =
[
pij
]
is called the column
scrambler. This matrix is a non singular
square matrix of order n. It is used to mix
columns of Gk.
If P is a matrix over the base field Fq , then
a matrix GkP has just the same structure
as the matrix Gk with a different first row.
Hence, from the point of view of breaking,
matrices Gpub = SGkP and Gpub = SGk
are equivalent. A cryptographer may not use
a matrix P at all.
On the other hand, if entries pij are in the
extension field Fqn , then a matrix P makes
breaking much harder. We shall analyze this
case.
2) Another generator matrix is obtained by an
extension of matrix Gk:
Gpub = S
[
X Gk
]
P. (4)
A matrix X of size k×t1 is called a distortion
source matrix. This matrix is a part of the
concatenation
[
X Gk
]
. The column rank
of X is Rk(X | Fq) = t1. The number t1 is a
design parameter. Another design parameter
is the ordinary rank which can take values
from 1 to t1. The rank distance of a code
generated by the matrix Gpub is not less than
the rank distance of a code generated by the
matrix S
[
O Gk
]
P.
A matrix P is called the column scrambler.
This matrix is a non-singular square matrix
of order n + t1. It is used to mix and to
corrupt columns of Gk by means of the
distortion source matrix X.
Note that in previous works, the matrix P has
all its entries in the base field Fq. Overbeck’s
attack against this PKC succeeded due to this
fact. But the attack fails for the proper choice
of P over the extension field Fqn [12].
3)
Gpub = S
[
X Gk
]
P. (5)
Here a scrambling matrix S is a rectangular
(k − p)× k matrix.
4)
Gpub = S
(
[O Gk] + [X1 X2]
)
P. (6)
Here: the row scrambler S is a square non-
singular matrix of order k with entries in Fqn
chosen at random; O is the k × m matrix
of 0’s; X1 is some k × m matrix — the
first distortion matrix; X2 is a k × n matrix
with r(X2|F1) = t1 — the second distortion
matrix; the column scrambler P is a non-
singular matrix of order n+m with entries
in Fq.
2) Plaintext: For public keys (3), (4) and (6), a
plaintext is any k-vector m = (m1,m2, . . . ,mk),
ms ∈ Fqn , s = 1, 2, . . . , k. For the public key (5),
a plaintext is a (k − p)-vector.
3) Private keys: The Private keys are matrices
S,Gk,X, ,X1,X2,P separately and (explicitly) a
fast decoding algorithm of an MRD code. Note
also, that the matrices X,X1,X2 are not used
to decrypt a ciphertext and can be deleted after
calculating the Public key.
4) Encryption: Let m = (m1,m2, . . . ,mk) be
a plaintext. The corresponding ciphertext is given
by
c = mGpub + e = mS[X|Gk]P+ e, (7)
where e is an artificial vector of errors of rank t2
or less, randomly chosen and added by the sending
party. The number t2 is the third design parameter.
5) Decryption: The legitimate receiver upon re-
ceiving c calculates
c′ = cP−1 = mS[X|Gk] + eP
−1.
Then he extracts from c′ the plaintext m using
decoding algorithms and properties of public keys.
III. THE OVERBECK ATTACK - AN IDEA
In [10], [11], a new attack is proposed on the
GPT PKC described by means of Eq. (4).
It is claimed, that similar attacks can be proposed
on all the variants of GPT PKC.
We can not describe the attack in detail but recall
briefly an idea of this attack.
We need some notations.
For x ∈ Fqn , let σ : Fqn → Fqn , σ(x) = xq
be the Frobenius automorphism.
For the matrix T = (tij) over Fqn , let σ(T) =
(σ(tij)) = (t
q
ij).
For any integer s, let σs(T) = σ(σs−1(T)).
It is clear that σn = σ. Thus the inverse exists
σ−1 = σn−1.
The following simple properties of σ are useful:
• σ(a+ b) = σ(a) + σ(b).
• σ(ab) = σ(a)σ(b).
• In general, for matrices σ(T) 6= T.
• If P is a matrix over the base field Fq , then
σ(P) = P.
6) An idea of Overbeck’s attack: To break a
system, a cryptanalyst constructs from the public
key Gpub = S
[
X Gk
]
P the extended public
key as follows:
Gext,pub =
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
Gpub
σ(Gpub)
σ2(Gpub)
. . .
σu(Gpub)
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
. (8)
The property that σ(P) = P, if P is a matrix
over the base field Fq, is used in (8). Further
transformations of Eq. (8) allows to obtain the first
row of the check matrix H of the rank code used.
It is enough to break the cryptosystem.
If P is a matrix over the extension field Fqn ,
then σ(P) 6= P.
We have to stress that Overbeck’s attack fails
in this case.
Moreover Gibson’s attacks use also in implicit
form the condition σ(P) = P and can not be
implemented without it.
Our intention is to show that there exist column
scramblers P in the extension field Fqn such that
the GPT PKC works and is secure against all
known attacks.
IV. OTHER ATTACKS ON THE GPT PKC
An important part of a decryption procedure
is correcting rank errors using a fast decoding
algorithm known to the legitimate party. An unau-
thorized party may want to correct rank errors by
a general algorithm without any knowledge of the
structure of a rank code. We consider algorithms
described in [15] and in the recent paper [16].
The authors of [15] proposed two algorithms for
decoding an arbitrary (n, k) linear rank distance
code over FqN . These algorithms correct errors
of rank t =
⌊
n−k
2
⌋
in O
(
(Nt)3q(t−1)(k+1)
)
and
O
(
(k + t)3t3q(t−1)(N−t)
)
operations in Fq respec-
tively.
Consider as an example a case when we use a
(28, 14) rank code with N = n = 28, k = 14, q =
2, d = 15, t = 7. The size of the public key is equal
to Nnk = 10976 bits. To correct 7-fold rank errors,
Ourivski–Johansson’s algorithms [15] require 2113
and 2147 operations in F2. Thus these attacks are
infeasible for practical implementations.
The algorithm of [16] requires
O
(
log(q)N3(N−t)
)
operations. We have for the
above example 2302 operations. Thus this attack
is also infeasible for practical implementations.
V. THE SIMPLE GPT PKC
Consider the public key of Eq. (3). No distortion
matrix X is used. A ciphertext has the form
c = mSGkP+ e, (9)
where the rank Rk(e | Fq) = t1 of an artificial
error e is less or equal to t = ⌊n−k2 ⌋.
Brute-force attacks are based on the exhaustive
search of possible artificial errors e. It depends on
the number of error vectors. If artificial errors are
all possible n-vectors of rank t1, then the number
of operations to search is O (qnt1).
Attacks on the public key contemplate to find
unknown factors (to a cryptanalyst) S, Gk and
P, or, to find matrices S˜, G˜k and P˜ such that
SGkP = S˜G˜kP˜ from the known public key
matrix SGkP .
Assume first that the column scrambler P is a
matrix over the base field Fq . The legitimate user
knows the secret key P and P−1. His algorithm is
as follows.
1) Get a ciphertext c = mSGkP+ e.
2) Multiply to the right by P−1. Get an inter-
mediate ciphertext
c′ = cP−1 = mSGk + eP
−1. (10)
Note that Rk(eP−1 | Fq) = Rk(e | Fq) =
t1 ≤ t = ⌊
n−k
2 ⌋ since P
−1 is in the base
field Fq .
3) Decode c′ using a fast decoding algorithm
and get mS.
4) Get a plaintext m as (mS)S−1.
On the other hand, the cryptanalyst can get a
successful representation Gpub = S˜G˜k for the
equivalent rank code with the generator matrix G˜k
from the public key SGkP. It can be done by
means of Gibson–Overbeck’s attacks and therefore
break the system.
The situation is quite different if P is a matrix
over the extension field FqN . For the general matrix
P, it is unknown how to solve the following
problems: to find the public key factors S, Gk
and P, or, to find matrices S˜, G˜k and P˜ such
that SGkP = S˜G˜kP˜ from the known public key
matrix SGkP. Gibson–Overbeck’s attacks are not
applicable if a matrix P is chosen in the extension
field FqN .
We can assume from now on that Gibson’s and
Overbeck’s attacks can not be implemented. But
the cryptographer should select a secret column
scrambler P in the extension field FqN and a public
set E of artificial errors e such that
Rk(eP−1 | Fq) ≤ t =
⌊
n− k
2
⌋
, (11)
where eP−1 is an error in the intermediate cipher-
text (10).
a) Choice of E: The public set of artificial
errors is chosen as the set consisting of all n-
vectors in Fn
qN
with rank t1 < t:
E =
{
e : e ∈ FnqN ,Rk(e | Fq) = t1
}
.
b) Choice of P: The cryptographer chooses
an inverse matrix P−1 in the form P−1 =[
Q1 Q2
]
, where Q1 is a submatrix of size
n× (t− t1) with entries in the extension field FqN
while Q2 is a submatrix of size n × (n − t + t1)
with entries in the base field Fq.
Lemma 1: Let e be any n-vector of rank t1.
Then the condition Eq. (11) is hold.
Proof: We have eP−1 = e [Q1 Q2] =[
eQ1 eQ2
]
. A vector e can be represented as
e =
[
w1 w2 . . . wt1
]
A, where wj’s are
linearly independent over Fq and A is the t1 ×
n matrix over Fq of rank t1. Then eQ1 =[
w1 w2 . . . wt1
]
B1, where B1 = AQ1 is
the t1 × (t − t1) matrix over the extension field
FqN . It is clear that Rk(eQ1 | Fq) ≤ t− t1. Sim-
ilarly, eQ2 =
[
w1 w2 . . . wt1
]
B2, where
B2 = AQ2 is the t1 × (n − t + t1) matrix over
the base field Fq . It follows that Rk(eQ2 | Fq) =
min(t1, n− t+ t1) ≤ t1. Hence
Rk(eP−1 | Fq) ≤ Rk(eQ1 | Fq) + Rk(eQ2 | Fq)
≤ (t− t1) + t1 = t =
⌊
n−k
2
⌋
.
Remark 1: The matrix P−1 can be replaced by
a matrix P˜−1 = P−1Q, where Q is any n×n non
singular matrix over the base field Fq).
Example 1: Consider again the case when we
use a (28, 14) rank code with N = n = 28, k =
14, q = 2, d = 15, t = 7. Possible systems are
listed below.
t1 = 0, P in the extension field, attacks on PK –
Information sets attacks, brute-force attacks – not
needed, status – insecure.
t1 = 1, P in the extension field, attacks on
PK – unknown, brute-force attacks – 224, status
– insecure.
t1 = 2, P in the extension field, attacks on
PK – unknown, brute-force attacks – 248, status
– insecure.
t1 = 3, P in the extension field, attacks on PK –
unknown, brute-force attacks – 272, status – secure.
t1 = 4, P in the extension field, attacks on PK –
unknown, brute-force attacks – 296, status – secure.
t1 = 5, P in the extension field, attacks on
PK – unknown, brute-force attacks – 2120, status –
secure.
t1 = 6, P in the extension field, attacks on
PK – unknown, brute-force attacks – 2144, status –
secure.
t1 = 7, P in the base field, attacks on PK
– Gibson–Overbeck, brute-force attacks – 2168,
status – insecure.
For t1 = 0 . . . 2, the system is insecure due
to brute-force attacks. For t1 = 7, the system
is insecure because of Gibson–Overbeck’s attacks
since in this case the matrix P is in the base field
Fq. But for t1 = 3 . . . 6, the system is secure
against all known attacks. We recommend the value
t1 = 3, or the value t1 = 4.
VI. OTHER VARIANTS OF THE GPT PKC
We can repeat word for word all previous con-
siderations for variants (4)- (6) and choose for
each case a proper column scrambler P over the
extension field FqN . This prevents Overbeck’s and
Gibson’s attacks.
VII. CONCLUSION
An approach is presented to withstand attacks
on the GPT Public key cryptosystem based on rank
codes.
It is shown that there exist column scramblers P
over the extension field FqN which allow decryp-
tion for the authorized party while an unauthorized
party can not break the system by means of known
attacks.
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